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Abstract
Error function analysis is an effective attack against chaotic cryptograph
[PRE 66, 065202(R) (2002)]. The basin structure of the error function is
crucial for determining the security of chaotic cryptosystems. In the present
paper the basin behavior of the system used in [21] is analyzed in relation
with the estimation of its practical security. A S-box algebraic operation is
included in the chaotic cryptosystem, which considerably shrinks the basin
of the error function and thus greatly enhances the practical security of the
system with a little computational expense.
PACS numbers: 05.45.Vx, 05.45.Ra
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, secure communication based on chaos synchronization has attracted
continual attention [1-9]. In early stage, scientists in this field did much effort in inventing
methods to hide private message in chaotic signals and in presenting a variety of designs
for chaos synchronization of encryption and decryption systems. Recently, the study has
gone further into practical aspects. The standard evaluations popularly used in the conven-
tional secure communication on some essential cryptographic properties, such as security,
performance and robustness against channel noise and so on, have been applied to chaotic
cyptosystems. With these evaluations some advantages and disadvantages of chaos-based
cryptosystems have been explored [10-18]. In this paper, we will propose a new chaotic
cryptosystem and focus on evaluating its security.
Chaotic cryptograph is based on analytical floating point computation [18], and it has
a property of aperiodicity, which is very much desirable for secure communication. Though
any trajectory of autonomous chaos must be periodic in computer realizations with finite
precision, the actual period of a system with a number of chaotic coupled oscillators (e.g.,
ten oscillators) may be so large that realistic communications can never reach this period,
and thus aperiodicity is practically kept in most of spatiotemporally chaotic systems [19].
Moreover, chaotic systems have positive Lyapunov exponents leading to the sensitivity of
trajectories to initial conditions and system parameters, and these features characterize very
good properties of bit diffusion and confusion [17,20]. In particular, in spatiotemporal chaos
with large numbers of positive Lyapunov exponents, these bit confusion and diffusion are
conducted in multiple directions and high dimensions of variable spaces, and may thus be-
come rather strong. This is of crucial importance for the high security of cryptosystems.
However, chaotic cryptograph has some serious weakness in its security. First, since any
chaotic output is based on floating-point analytical computation, the underlying dynamics,
including its parameters of secret key, may be pursued (some times very easily [10-17]).
Second, positive Lyapunov exponents determine certain finite bit confusion rate, this finite-
2
ness may not fast enough to confuse small parameter mismatches and may present certain
basin structures around the secret key (see Fig.1 in [21] and Fig.2 in [22]), which can be
used by intruders for effective attacks. On the other hand, conventional cryptograph uses
algebraic operations on integers, some methods such as S-box transformation can greatly
increase the difficulty of attacks of analytical computations, and can effectively distort and
even eliminate basin around the secret key. Nevertheless, a single or few S-box operations
cannot make sufficiently strong bit diffusion and confusion, and many rounds of S-box or
other algebraic operations are needed for reaching high security (e.g., for Advanced En-
crytption Standard, AES, one needs 10, 12 and 14 rounds for 128bit, 192bits and 256bit
keys, respectively). Therefore, it is interesting to combine approaches of both chaotic and
conventional cryptographic methods, and to enhance the security of cryptosystems in some
convenient ways. This has been done before by a number of authors[17,18,23]. In this paper,
we will apply the idea of S-box in our chaotic cryptograph which mainly uses floating point
analytical computation.
In [21] we suggested to apply spatiotemporal chaos produced by a one-way coupled one-
dimensional map lattice for achieving high practical security. In [22] a two-dimensional map
lattice is used for obtaining efficient performance, i.e., fast encryption and decryption speeds,
by applying parallel encryption (decryption) operations from different chaotic sites. In this
paper we will go further from [21] by incorporating the S-box algebraic operation in the
chaotic cryptograph and reach high security with low computation expense. The paper will
be organized as follows. In Sec.II we specify our system and present some cryptographic
results without S-box, which will be evaluated by the error function. And the basin structure
and its influence on the practical security are analyzed in detail. In Sec.III, we include a
S-box operation, and show that with the combinatorial applications of spatiotemporal chaos
and S-box the key basin of the error function is effectively shrunk to a single point well in
the computation precision. This leads to great enhancement of the security of the chaotic
crytposystem. In the last section, brief discussion and conclusion of the practical security of
the system against other attacks currently used in chaotic and conventional cryptanalyses
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are presented.
II. CHAOTIC CRYPTOSYSTEM AND ITS SECURITY EVALUATION
We start from the cryptosystem of one-way coupled map lattice used in [21], with a
slight modification by using the nonlinear parameters rather than coupling parameters as
the secret key. The encryption transformation reads
xn+1(j) = (1− ε)fj[xn(j)] + εfj [xn(j − 1)], (1a)
fj(x) = (3.75 + aj/4)x(1− x), j = 1, ..., m
xn+1(j) = (1− ε)f [xn(j)] + εf [xn(j − 1)], (1b)
f(x) = 4x(1− x), j = m+ 1, ..., N
Sn = (Kn + In) mod 2
ν , Kn = [int(xn(N)× 2µ] mod 2ν (1c)
xn(0) = Sn/2
ν (1d)
and the decryption transformation is
yn+1(j) = (1− ε)fj[yn(j)] + εfj[yn(j − 1)], (2a)
fj(x) = (3.75 + bj/4)x(1− x), j = 1, ..., m
yn+1(j) = (1− ε)f [yn(j)] + εf [yn(j − 1)], j = m+ 1, ..., N (2b)
K
′
n = [int(yn(N)× 2µ] mod 2ν , I
′
n = (Sn −K
′
n) mod 2
ν (2c)
yn(0) = Sn/2
ν = xn(0) (2d)
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In Eqs.(1) and (2), a = (a1, a2, · · · , am) and b = (b1, b2, · · · , bm) serve as the secret keys of
encryption and decryptoin, respectively, which can be freely chosen in the interval (0, 1).
The transmitter sends the ciphertext Sn in the public channel, and the receiver can achieve
chaos synchronization with the transmitter by applying the decryption key b = a and the
ciphertext driving yn(0) = xn(0) = Sn/2
ν , and then correctly receive the plaintext as
yn(N) = xn(N), K
′
n = Kn, I
′
n = In (3)
We assume that the intruder has the same communication machine, and thus he knows
the structure of Eqs.(1) and (2), and knows also the values of all the system parameters
(N,m, µ, ν, ε) except the secret key a. Moreover, the intruder has full knowledge (past and
present) of ciphertexts Sn because Sn is transmitted in the open channel, and a part of
past plaintexts In of length T (say, from n = 1 to n = T ) due to some chances. With the
above messages accessible to the intruder we have to consider resistance against the public-
structure and plaintext-known attacks. There exist many attacks of this type, among which
we will consider the error function attack (EFA) by computing the following error function
[21]
e(b) =
1
T
T∑
n=1
∣∣∣i′n − in∣∣∣ , in = In2ν , i′n = I
′
n
2ν
(4)
from which the intruder may try to extract the secret key a and then unmask all future
plaintext. Since EFA fully uses all information available for the legal receiver except the
secret key only, it can be regarded as a very effective attack.
Now we start our numerical simulation with the following parameters fixed throughout
the paper
m = 4, µ = 52, ν = 32, ε = 0.99, aj = 0.5, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 (5)
In Figs.1(a)-(d) we fix N = 25, T = 105, and b2 = b3 = b4 = 0.5, and run the cryptosystem
by varying a single test key parameter b1, and plot e(b1) vs b1 for different test resolutions.
The initial values of both transmitter and receiver are chosen arbitrarily, and they vary for
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different runs. In computing (4) 100 transient iterations are discarded. In Figs.1(c) and (d)
the error function e(b1) shows a clear basin around the actual key b1 = a1, and in Figs.1(a)
and (b) far away from the basin we have e(b1) ≈ 13 .
Suppose two data sequences An andBn are completely random, and uniformly distributed
in [0, 1] , and they are completely uncorralated from each other, then the average error
between two data sequences is
〈e(A,B)〉 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
n=1
|An − Bn| (6)
=
1
3
The square root of variance of this error for the sequences of length T reads
σ =
(
1
T
T∑
n=1
(|An − Bn| − 〈e〉)2
) 1
2
≈ 1
3
√
2T
(7)
It is confirmed that the numerical results of e(b1) plotted in Fig.1 satisfy both relations
Eqs.(6) and (7) in very high precision when b1 is chosen far from the key basin. This
indicates that the output keystream Kn and K
′
n of Eqs.(1) and (2) have rather good sta-
tistical properties of randomness and uniform distributions in (0, 1), and both Kn and K
′
n
are practically independent from each other if |b1 − a1| is considerably larger than the basin
width.
In [21], similar error function basin was observed (Fig.1 in [21]). Now we will go further to
study the functional behavior of this basin with numerical data, which will be important for
predicting the security level of the system against EFA. We find that e(b1) can be presented
by a united empirical formula
e(b1) =
1
3
1
1 + ( c1
|b1−a1|
)α(b1)
, α(b1) =
1 + 5
3
|b1−a1|
c2
1 + |b1−a1|
c2
, (8)
c1 = 2.8× 10−12, c2 = 4.0× 10−9
which is plotted by the solid curves in Figs.2(a) and (b). The formula prediction of Eq.(8)
perfectly coincides with the numerical results of e(b1) [circles, T = 10
3 for (a) and 107 for
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(b)] for all ranges from |b1 − a1| ≪ c2 to |b1 − a1| ≫ c2. In both limits of large and small
|b1 − a1| the error function has interesting scalings of
e(b1) ∝ |b1 − a1|α1 , α1 = 1, |b1 − a1| ≪ c2 (9a)
1
3
− e(b1) ∝ |b1 − a1|−α2 , α2 = 5
3
, |b1 − a1| ≫ c2 (9b)
With the basin structure of Figs.1 and 2, the intruder can make EFA as follows. Suppose
the error function has a key basin of width W . Away from the key basin, the error function
is flat e(b1) ≈ 13 with certain fluctuation, the intruder cannot find any tendency toward the
position of the key. Therefore, he can make only brute force attack to find the key basin
with average cost of L
W
, where L is the space length available for setting the key (in our case
L = 1). If the intruder finds the key basin, he can find the tendency in the basin towards
the key, and can easily expose the key position by certain optimal searching methods, such
as adaptive searching. Therefore, the width of the key basin W , is an extremely important
quantity for the security of our system against EFA. This width can be conveniently defined
from Eq.(8). According to Eq.(8) the error function e(b1) is monotonously decreasing towards
the key. Nevertheless, as
∣∣ 1
3
− e(b1)
∣∣≪ 1 (i.e., |b1 − a1| ≫ 13) and T is finite, the inevitable
fluctuation of e(b1) characterized by Eq.(7) may be considerably larger than
1
3
− e(b1), and
thus can definitely mask the monotonous tendency of Eq.(8). According to this argument
the basin width W may be defined as being proportional to the distance between the right
and left boundaries br and bl
W = β(br − bl) (10a)
1
3
− e(bl,r) ≈ 1
3
√
2T
(10b)
where the multiple factor β in Eq.(10a) can be roughly chosen such that for |b1 − a1| > W
no any tendency towards the key location of e(b1) can be observed. Equations (10) and (9b),
together, lead to
7
W ∝ T 12α2 ≈ T 0.3 (11)
For larger T we can certainly have larger width W and need less tests ( 1
W
) for finding the
key basin, but meantime we need more computation time for each test (T iterations for
each test), and need more cost for collecting longer known plaintext data. Therefore, the
total computation cost for finding the key basin in the space of four parameters (b1, b2, b3, b4)
reads
Cost ≈ ( 1
W (T )
)4T (12)
For numerical simulations we define bl and br by the first left and right crossings of e(b1)
over 1
3
, respectively, when b1 varies from b1 = a1 to large |b1 − a1|, and W is defined as
W = 10(br − bl) according to Eq.(10a). In Figs.3(a)-(d) we plot e(b1) for different T ’s by
keeping other parameters the same as Fig.1, where bl, br and W are clearly indicated. The
crossing points bl and br may fluctuate in different runs, but this fluctuation does not affect
the general tendency between W and T . In Fig.3(e) we plot W against T where the solid
line denotes the scaling line
logW = −10.53 + 0.30 log T, W = 2.95× 10−11T 0.30 (13)
while dots respect numerical data. These numerical results fully confirm the prediction of
Eq.(11) which is deduced from the empirical formula Eq.(8) and the scaling relation Eq.(9b).
Inserting Eq.(13) into Eq.(12) we can specify the cost to break the security of the system.
The minimal computation cost for breaking our system by EFA can be achieved at T ≈ 1036
and W (T ) ≈ 1 that produces
Cost ≈ 1036 Iterations (14)
III. CHAOTIC CRYPTOGRAPH WITH A S-BOX OPERATION
Though the security given by Eq.(14) is rather high (equivalent to the effective key
of 120 bits), the basin of Eq.(8) restricts the security level. This basin structure is due
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to the insensitivity of chaos synchronization to very small mismatch of the corresponding
parameters in analytical computation of chaos.
With smaller system size N , the output keystream K
′
n has even lower sensitivity to the
variable of b (i.e., has larger basin width W ), and accordingly the system has even lower
security. In order to shrink the basin width and further increase the sensitivity of K
′
n to
small change of the key b with a given smaller system size (i.e., with less computational
expenses), one has to perform some additional (nonanalytical) operation to directly shift
the bits corresponding to small key variation to the position corresponding to larger key
variation. Specifically, we modify Eqs.(1) and (2) as following.
First, we change (1d) and (2d) to
xn(0) =

Sn/2
ν , for 1
8
6 Sn/2
ν 6
7
8
Sn/2
ν + 1
8
, for Sn/2
ν < 1
8
Sn/2
ν − 1
8
, for Sn/2
ν > 7
8
(15)
yn(0) = xn(0)
respectively. These changes effectively increase the sensitivity of the keystreams Kn and K
′
n
to the secret key a and b, respectively, for small (large) and even zero Sn (or Sn/2
ν = 1).
In Eq.(2) such sensitivity is very low for 0 < Sn/2
ν ≪ 1 and 0 < 1 − Sn/2ν ≪ 1 , and this
weakness can be intelligently used by the intruder with the chosen-ciphertext attack [24].
Second, we add a S-box in the (m+ 1)th map in both transmitter and receiver, namely, we
modify the (m+ 1)th map of Eq.(1) as
x′n+1(m+ 1) = (1− ε)f [xn(m+ 1)] + εf [xn(m)],
Q
′
n = [int(x
′
n(m+ 1)× 2µ] mod 2ν (16a)
Qn = Sbox(Q
′
n)
xn+1(m+ 1) = Qn/2
ν (16b)
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where the S-box is defined as follows:
A1 = [(Q
′
n ≫ 24)&255], A2 = [(Q
′
n ≫ 16)&255],
A3 = [(Q
′
n ≫ 8)&255], A4 = Q
′
n&255, (17)
A0 = A1 ⊕A2 ⊕A3 ⊕ A4
Qn = [A0 ≪ 24] + [A4 ≪ 16] + [A3 ≪ 8] + A2
In Fig.4 we show the operations of Eq.(17) schematically. The operation x ≫ y denotes a
right shift of x by y bits and the & operator is bitwise AND and ⊕ means bitwise XOR [25].
After the S-box transformation of (17) all the 32 bits in Q
′
n take place in the highest bits
in Qn through A0. And this operation greatly enhances the sensitivity of the output Sn to
the mismatches of the secret key (these mismatches are naturally reflected in the low bits
of Q
′
n). The decryption transformation (2) has exactly the same S-box operation as
y′n+1(m+ 1) = (1− ε)f [yn(m+ 1)] + εf [yn(m)], (18a)
Q̂
′
n = [int(y
′
n(m+ 1)× 2µ] mod 2ν
Q̂n = Sbox(Q̂
′
n)
yn+1(m+ 1) = Q̂n/2
ν (18b)
The modified chaotic cryptosystem basically performs analytical floating-point computa-
tions on continuous variables. However, its performance is incorporating with a very simple
conventional operation based on algebraic transformations supported by integer variables.
The following operations in the whole arithmetic of the system Eqs.(1), (2) and (15)-(18)
are of crucial importance for achieving optimal cryptographic properties:
(i) The transmitted signal Sn is defined as integer sequences by the int operation in
Eqs.(1d), (2d), and this operation effectively enhances the robustness of the communication
against noise disturbances in the transmission channel, and against the round-off errors of
both transmitter and receiver computers. This improvement is extremely important when
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the system has very high security (i.e., very high sensitivity to small changes of system
parameters, variables and driving signal).
(ii) We apply modulo operations on some integer variables [Eqs.(1c), (2c), (16), and (18)].
These operations greatly enhance the sensitivity of chaos synchronization to the secret key
parameters (a and b), and considerably increase the difficulty of any attacks based on
analytical computations.
(iii) The S-box operations of Eqs.(16)-(18) dramatically change the basin structure of
Figs.1 and 2, and effectively improve the security of the chaotic cryptograph. Particular
attention will be paid on this point in the following discussion.
In Figs.5(a)-(d) we do the same as Figs.1(a)-(d), respectively, with modifications (15)-
(18) taken into account. It is remarkable that with the S-box operation, the continuous
basin in Figs.1 and 2 shrinks now to a singular needle-like structure with zero width. In
Fig.5 various refinements of detection precision up to 2−45 precision do not help to amplify
the basin width, this is in sharp contrast with Figs.1 where finer detection precision can
show larger and clearer basins [Fig.1(d)].
Another significant point is that the singular needle-like basin structure cannot be
changed by collecting and applying more known past plaintexts, i.e., by increasing T . In
Figs.6(a)-(d) we do the same as Figs.3(a)-(d), respectively, with Eqs.(15)-(18) applied. It
is clear that W = 2−45 is kept for different T ’s of which the largest one is up to T = 108
(3.2× 109 bits plaintext). For collecting so many data of plaintext one has to illegally hear
a given secure talk for about five days without any break (in normal voice communication,
the transmission speed is about 8k bits per second). Thus, the practical security of our
modified chaotic cryptosystem against EFA is determined by the key number 2180 (four key
parameters, each 45 bits) with the system size N = 10, which is much higher than that
without the S-box operation [2120 given by Eq.(14)] with considerably larger size N = 25.
It is emphasized that the S-box of Eq.(17) is very simple and needs little computation
cost. This operation can thus hardly produce effective bit confusion and diffusion by itself
in the conventional cryptograph. Nevertheless, incorporating with spatiotemporal chaos
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synchronization this algebraic transformation can greatly enhance the practical security
of chaotic cryptograph. This is the most significant result of the present paper that a
suitable combinatorial applications of both chaotic and conventional cryptographies may
yield surprisingly high benefit.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In conclusion we would like to remark that the modified chaotic system [Eqs.(1) and
(2) with modifications of (15)-(18)] is highly secure against EFA, which is a very strong
attack because with this attack the intruder effectively uses all information accessible to the
legal receiver, except the secret key only. We assume that the security against EFA may
be probably the actual practical security of the system. Nevertheless, in this conclusion
part we would like to briefly mention the difficulties and the results (without giving much
reasonings) of some other possible attacks in evaluating our system. The detailed analysis
on all these attacks is in preparation and will be presented elsewhere [27].
First, the keystream Kn and, accordingly, the transmitted signal Sn have very good
statistical properties. They satisfactorily pass the randomness checking of all the 16 types
of NIST Standard evaluations of [26] for arbitrary plaintexts. The keystream (Kn/2
ν) has
uniform distributions in the interval (0,1) up to q-order (q’s from 1 to 4 have been carefully
checked, and even higher orders up to q = 10 have been roughly checked). These uniform
distributions remain unchanged by widely changing the secret key and the plaintexts. The
probability distribution of differences between any ciphertexts is practically independent of
the difference of the corresponding plaintexts. Thus, many attacks in conventional cryp-
toalaysis such as linear attack and differential attack can hardly work for our system. And
all attacks based on statistics analysis may not work effectively.
Second, most of attacks used in chaotic cryptography, such as nonlinear dynamics fore-
casting and dynamics reconstructs [10-16] are definitely not efficient for evaluating our sys-
tem, because these approaches apply ciphertext–only and private-structure attacks. With-
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out enjoying the information of system dynamics and known plaintext these attacks are
incomparably weaker. These attacks often reconstructs the system dynamics by construct-
ing time-delay return maps. Due to the good statistical properties mentioned above these
return maps all have uniform distributions from which one can hardly find any trace of the
system dynamics as well as the secret key.
Usually, chaotic cryptograph may be easily attacked by analytical computations in the
case of one-round encryption. However, in our case nonlinearity together with multiplicity
of coupled maps makes analytical attacks difficult. The truncations and S-box operations
break simple analytical relations between the key and the output signals. A simple analysis
shows that attacks based on analytical solution need much more computational cost than
EFA for breaking the security of the system.
Recently, Hu et al proposed a chosen-ciphertext attack to evaluate chaotic cryptosys-
tems[24], which is very strong. It can be shown that this chosen-ciphertext attack can break
the security of Eqs.(1) and (2) without S-box operation with much less cost than Eq.(14),
i.e., this attack is much stronger than EFA. However, with the S-box operation and the
associated modifications((15)-(18)), the chosen-ciphertext attack can be made completely
ineffective by including the bits of the secret key (a for encryption and b for decryption).
An analysis similar to [24] shows that the computation cost of the chosen-ciphertext attack
of [24] is again much more expensive than EFA. This matter will be discussed in detail in
our future work. It is well known that chosen-ciphertext attacks are among the strongest
attacks if we classify the intensities of various evaluations[18,24]. Thus, it is reasonable to
estimate the practical security of our system by Eq.(4) and Fig.5.
With respect to the problem of security, our system has a good advantage over AES.
Our system is practically one-time pad cryptograph if its secret key can be well hidden
and the encryption time is much shorter than the period of computer realization of chaos.
On the contrary, AES is definitely not one-time pad even if its key is kept secret because
for AES same inputs always produce same outputs. Our system has fairly fast encryption
speed. With the C code running a Pentium III (700MHz) computer it can encrypt 50Mbit
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ciphers (with the key length of 180 bits) which is comparable to that of AES having a speed
of 83Mbit per second with a key of 192 bits by using the same computer. The encryption
speed of our system can be further greatly enhanced by parallel encryption operations of
multiple space units [22].
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our system will not suffer from the periodicity
of finite precision computer realization of chaos. By increasing the number of coupled maps
those period increases rapidly. We certainly cannot directly detect the period of our system
because it is too long. An estimation, based on small number of coupled maps shows that
the period of our system with N = 10 and double precision computation is about 1070 [19].
The currently best computer in the world needs to work more than 1045 years to reach this
period, and thus spatiotemporal chaos can be surely observed in our system for practically
unlimited uses.
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Captions of Figures
Fig.1. Error function e(b1) defined in Eq.(4) vs the decryption key parameter b1 with
different detection resolutions. T = 105. The basins of the error function around the key
position b1 = a1 can be clearly observed in (c) and (d).
Fig.2 (a) and (b) Comparison of the prediction of Eq.(8) (solid lines) with numerical
measurements (circles) of the error function Eq.(4) for T = 103 [(a)] and T = 107 [(b)],
respectively. Agreements of the analytical predictions with numerical results are satisfac-
tory. The agreement shown in (b) is particularly desirable since there fluctuation of e(b1) is
considerably reduced by taking rather long T = 107 (3.2× 108 bits plaintext).
Fig.3 Widths of the basins of error function e(b1) for different available lengths of plain-
texts (a) T = 103, (b) T = 104, (c) T = 106, (d) T = 107, respectively. The boundaries bl and
br are defined by the first crossings of e(b1) over e(b1) =
1
3
when b1 varies from b1 = a1 = 0.5
to left and right, respectively. And the basin width W is taken as W = 10(br − bl). (e)
W = 10(br −bl) plotted vs T . The solid line is the prediction of Eq.(11) while the circles
represent numerical data. Both coincide with each other satisfactorily.
Fig.4 The schematic figure of the S-box operation of Eq.(17). (a) Four bytes A1, A2,
A3 and A4 divided from Q
′
n of 32 bits, and A0 produced from Ai via XOR operations. (b)
Produce Qn of 32 bits from the four bytes A0, A4, A3, and A2.
Fig.5 The same as Fig.1 with the modifications (15)-(18) taken into account. T = 105.
The error function basin shrinks now to a needle-like single point, irregarding the detection
resolution, this is in sharp contrast with the behavior of Fig.1. In (d) the resolution is up
to 2−45, indicating that the key number of the four parameters b1 to b4 can be up to 2
180.
Fig.6 The same as Figs.3(a)-(d), respectively, with Eqs.(15)-(18) applied. Increasing
T can effectively reduce the fluctuation of e(b1), but cannot change the needle-like basin
structure.
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